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THE POOR IMAGE OF THE
PROFESSION AND THE ETHICAL
PRESSURES ON THE MODERN LAWYER
RODNEY A. SMOLLA*
Introduction
In November 1996 1 had the great privilege of attending the 22nd
Annual Legal Ethics Institute at Washington and Lee University. It was an
exceptional weekend of retreat and contemplation. This essay treats a
number of the themcs that were prominent in our discussions that week-
end: the image of the lawyer in modem America, the tension between law
and morality, the source of ethical intuitions and rules for lawyers, the
currents of contemporary culture, and the ways in which those currents
play into the evolving place of lawyers in our society.
The Cultural Image of the Profession
Lawyers in America often complain about the cultural image of the
profession. Movies, novels, public opinion polls, and lawyer jokes reveal
a pervasive cultural doubt about whether the legal profession is honorable
and the justice system just. At its worst, lawyers are seen as shysters and
crooks, and the justice system as a variant of organized crime. Under this
view, lawyers routinely bribe juries, manufacture or destroy evidence as
their needs require, suborn perjury, force or alter documents, and generally
"do what it takes" to win, service their clients, and earn large fees.
But while any sensible person understands that corrupt lawyers and
judges certainly do exist, the poor cultural image of lawyers does not stem
primarily from a belief that most lawyers andjudges are actually criminals.
The poor image instead comes from a widely shared sense that there is
something intrinsic in the American legal system and intrinsic in the
American concept of what it means to be a lawyer that tends to drain the
system and its participants of moral sensibility. The problem with the legal
*Rodney A. Smolla is the Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law at the College of
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profession is not that it is affirmatively immoral, but that it is passively
amoral. The problem is not that Americans believe that lawyers are liars,
but that they believe lawyers do not tell the truth.
The Legal Profession's Defense
The classic response of the profession to all of this is that the people
just do not understand. The American Bar Association attacks the portrayal
of lawyers as sharpsters in movies and television programs as cheap, unfair
sensationalizing that undermines public confidence in the integrity of the
legal system. Even lawyer jokes are seen as corrosive, for they reinforce the
false cultural perception that lawyers are mostly scorpions and vipers.
In defending itself, the profession argues that what the movies and
lawyer jokes fail to show us are all the attorneys who devote themselves
to championing the rights of the poor and oppressed, who dedicate
themselves to the preservation of civil rights and civil liberties, who labor
tirelessly to ferret out frauds and charlatans, who take on clients and causes
for no compensation, all because they believe it is the right thing to do. The
legal system is adversarial, and all who attempt to navigate it need and
deserve vigorous representation. There are strong ethical rules that govern
this adversarial system, and most lawyers strive earnestly to stay within the
bounds of those rules. Ethical concerns are prominent within the profes-
sion, and disciplinary boards police violations conscientiously. We are a
robust people with a robust justice system, but we should not confuse
aggressive lawyering with immoral or amoral lawyering. To be sure, most
lawyers are trained to pursue the interests of their clients with a certain
single-minded focus, but this is a good thing, not a bad one, and ultimately
draws from the same competitive ethos that animates all other sectors of
the free-enterprise economy.
The Curious Failure of the Defense
The legal profession's defense of itself is, on the face of it, highly
credible and seemingly persuasive. But if so, why has it done so poorly in
the court of public opinion? The one thing lawyers are supposed to be good
at is making a convincing case. Yet lawyers seem to have lost this one. How
can this be?
There is a temptation, of course, for lawyers to dismiss their
collective bad image as simply that: an image problem. If image is all that
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is at stake, the problem may be an annoyance but it is hardly grave:
attorneys are presumably tough enough to weather jokes and sleazy
dramatic portrayals.
Many, both inside the profession and out, however, may wonder if
more is at work. Perhaps in the dissonance between image and reality
something is revealed. Perhaps the gap between the noble ideal of the law
as an honorable profession and the popular perception of the law as
something less is worth plumbing for what it may uncover about the nature
of lawyering and the currents of modem culture.
The Difficulty of "Big Picture" Defenses
A major shortcoming of the legal profession's defense is that it
requires a vision of the big picture and a sense of the long run. "Big picture"
and "long run" defenses are never as gripping as the indictment immedi-
ately before us. Lawyers often seem immoral or amoral because we are
focused on behavior in a particular case, in which it appears that the
machinations of the lawyer, the clever moves and vigorous advocacy,
caused the system to reach the "wrong" result. The profession's response
is structural: we must look not at the result in this case, but rather the
system's dependance on the adversarial process as the only reliable long
term test of truth.
The Adversarial System and How Americans Love a Winner
The weakness of the "big picture" defense exposes an ambivalence
many Americans may have about the adversarial system itself. On one
level, our adversarial system is quintessentially American. We do not rely
on public opinion, conventional wisdom, orthodoxy, or consensus to
decide the outcome of legal disputes, but instead employ professionally
trained advocates to represent the opposing sides vigorously and battle it
out. In defending freedom of speech, Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote that
"the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market." The same might be said of how we test for
truth in the legal system, placing our reliance on the power of a proffered
fact or argument to gain ascendency in the legal "marketplace" of juries
and judges.
No juror or judge can know whether O.J. Simpson committed
murder. The best we can do is allow the criminal prosecutors (or the
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plaintiffs' lawyers in a civil suit) to contest the evidence to the hilt, leaving
juries to decide matters after weighing the presentations of both sides. To
many this may seem as American as it gets, as American as the old west,
presidential debates, or the National Football League. Few would express
admiration for a lawyer who is an outright crook, bribing judges and
witnesses, but many Americans do express admiration, at least with a wink
and a nod, for the lawyer who is "sharp" if not an actual sharpster, the
lawyer who can bend the rules or stretch the rules or tweak the system to
secure a win despite long odds. While many Americans were upset by the
jury's acquittal of O.J. Simpson, seeing it as a breakdown of the legal
system and a triumph of appeals to racial identity, many others not only
delighted in the verdict, but hero-worshiped Simpson's lawyer Johnnie
Cochran as someone who truly seemed willing to do whatever was
required to secure victory. In a culture that revels in contest, it is only
natural that rewards will come to those who win. Vince Lombardi said that
winning isn't everything, it's the only thing. And George C. Scott, in his
famous film portrayal of General George Patton, exclaimed that "all real
Americans love a winner, and will not tolerate a loser."
The Adversarial System and the Constitutional Faith
in the Marketplace
Holmes wrote of the marketplace of ideas: "It is an experiment, as
all life is an experiment." Holmes had no doubt about the wisdom of
experiment, and certainly no doubt about its constitutional pedigree;
reliance on the open marketplace, he claimed, was "the theory of our
Constitution."
Yet this linkage between the adversarial system, the faith in the
marketplace, and the Constitution does not solve the mystery of the legal
profession's bad image. On the contrary, it serves to deepen it. American
lawyers may plausibly contend that their adversarial mode of operating is
not just a good idea; it is an idea embedded in the Constitution itself. With
all this going for them, why do they still do so poorly in defending
themselves?
Lawyering as a Life of Splits
Perhaps there are clues to the causes of the poor image of the
profession to be found in exploring the recurring conflicts that lawyers
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confront within the adversarial system, and the toll exacted by those
conflicts on the human struggle to find value and meaning in life. A
modem lawyer is constantly forced to engage in "splits" in life, splits that
are fully justifiable morally and functionally necessary if a lawyer is to
fulfill his or her societal function. But these splits may come at a price.
They may take their toll on the psychological well-being of the individual
lawyer. They may take their toll on the cultural image of all lawyers.
The Split of Representation
The very act of representation can create ethical tensions. When I
represent another, I speak not entirely in my own voice, for my own
reasons, out of my own conviction. I speak on behalf of the interests of
another. This is, at its core, a perfectly honorable exercise, perfectly
natural and functionally necessary; society could not work without it. But
doing this all the time--constantly speaking for others rather than for
oneself-has its consequences. On a subtle level, speaking always and only
for others tends to slowly corrode authenticity. Many of the traditional
pejoratives aimed at lawyers capture this. The lawyer is "mouthpiece" or
"hired gun." He or she has no personal moral gyroscope but merely takes
on whatever cause is at hand, believing in whatever the client needs to be
believed in. A lawyer can become an actor, always playing a role, with no
authentic self discernable to others, and at its most destructive, no
authentic self discernable to the self.
The Split of Doubt
The split of representation may cause corrosion even when one
generally agrees with the interests of one's clients. Far less subtle,
however, is the "split of doubt," the infamous conflict that arises from
being placed in the position of having a duty to energetically advance the
interests of a client whom the lawyer, at some inner level, believes is in the
wrong. At its most dramatic level, this occurs when a criminal defense
lawyer strives with unchecked vigor to secure the acquittal of a defendant
whom the lawyer believes to be guilty. Very few practicing lawyers have
not been asked the question, at some point in their lives, "How can you
lawyers defend people you know are guilty?" It does not matter that the
lawyer asked the question specializes in tax, bankruptcy, real estate, or
immigration law; it does not matter that he or she may never have
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represented a criminal defendant, or may never even have set foot in a
courtroom. At certain visceral levels, all lawyers are lawyers, all lawyers
are Johnny Cochrane, urging "If it doesn't fit, you must acquit." All
lawyers are challenged to explain, in cocktail party conversations, in
lectures before the Rotary Club, in family gatherings at Thanksgiving,
"How can you lawyers represent people you know are guilty, and get them
off on technicalities?" After a glass of wine or two, the questioning may
get sharper and more righteous, with the interrogator invariably adding, "I
could never do that!"
Now lawyers, to be sure, are well trained to deal with these
questions. They repeat the stock answers, explaining how every person is
presumed innocent until proven guilty, how the Constitution guarantees
criminal defendants the assistance of counsel, and how there is an impor-
tant distinction betweenfactual guilt (well, yes, he did stab her) and legal
guilt (it was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he stabbed her with
premeditation). But these explanations are typically met with snickers and
even deeper self-righteousness. These systemic answers do not entirely
wash with the non-lawyer public. And indeed there is a general suspicion
that they do not so completely wash with lawyers themselves-at least,
that they would not wash if lawyers could be given a truth serum and made
to say what they really think. Many people just cannot accept that lawyers
do not feel at least some qualms about defending the clearly guilty. How
can they not?
Splits in Persona and the Role of Role
Another important split is the compartmentalization of persona.
This is not a phenomenon unique to lawyering, but lawyering implicates
a constant and often intense version of it. I call this the "role of role." The
"role of role" is a constant consideration in moral and ethical behavior. A
person might say, for example, "Let me offer you this advice. I'm not
speaking as your doctor now, but as your friend." This sentence pattern
gets repeated in endless permutations. I am not speaking as your lawyer
now, (or your teacher, or as any professional role we might substitute). I
am speaking as your friend (or your spouse, or your parent, or some other
social or familial role we might substitute).
What are we to make of the role of role? Is it a positive or a negative
that we are often tempted to give different answers to questions, or behave
differently in resolving ethical conflicts, based on the role we are in at the
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time? On one level, the answer must be that these differences in behavior
are justified. We must accept the role of role, if roles are to mean anything.
The clearest example of this involves confidentiality. One of the defining
characteristics of many official roles is that one is made privy to informa-
tion that one is supposed to keep in confidence. The priest and the penitent,
the psychological counselor or medical doctor and patient, the lawyer and
client-all have relationships of confidentiality imposed by ethical tradi-
tion and legal rules.
Yet even here there is a price to be paid. Sometimes one's intuitive
ethical response to a problem will vary dramatically depending on what
"hat" one is wearing. If you can look in the mirror and plainly see only one
hat on your head, you will usually be fine. But vision may become blurred
or doubled by a crisis; it may become difficult to see clearly what hat it is
that is on one's head, or even more disorienting, one may seem to see two
hats at once. Moving in and out of different personas too quickly can cause
a person to get the psychic bends. Lawyers are not immune from this
disease; like other professions in which the role of role is dominant, they
may get sick from rushed decompression.
The Split Between Moral Absolutes and Modern Realism
The typical practicing lawyer will probably not have the time or
disposition to take notice of it, but modem lawyers are also plagued by a
split that comes from long-term movements of intellectual history.
During the reign of natural law thought, a reign prior to the
positivism of philosophers like John Austin or the realism of thinkers such
as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Karl Llewellyn, and Jerome Frank, the
legitimacy of law was joined directly to fundamental religious or philo-
sophical absolutes. Natural Law thinkers like Thomas Aquinas tied the
legitimacy of human law to God's law. Social Contract thinkers like John
Locke and Thomas Hobbes managed to ground human law in concepts of
natural law that were still absolute and immutable, though perhaps without
requiring a belief in God.
The positivists, however, entirely divorced law from morality, and law
from absolutes. John Austin maintained that law was no more and no less than
a command from the sovereign enforced through sanction when disobeyed.
The existence of law was one thing, its merit or demerit another. Austin's
view of law was stark and brutal, and would later be echoed in Chairman
Mao's proclamation that all law comes from the mouth of a gun.
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As human law became divorced from larger philosophical and
religious systems, the place of the lawyer changed. A lawyer was no longer
someone who toiled in matters absolute or holy. The "stuff' with which
lawyers worked-their constitutions, statutes, and judicial precedents-
was now seen as the creature of human hands, not the hand of God or the
axioms of the Universe. The positivists taught that law was simply the
command of the sovereign. The realists emphasized the highly contingent
nature of those commands. Law was now simply the dictate of power, and
the business of the lawyer was to predict and influence power struggles.
From the perspective of clients, the job of the lawyer was as important as
ever. But it lost its mysticism, and much of its majesty.
A second consequence of modem positivism and realism was a
divorcing of ordinary principles of legal ethics from any larger system of
moral thought. As water cannot rise higher than its source, the ethical rules
that governed lawyers could not claim any higher moral plane than the
substantive legal principles with which lawyers worked. Ethical rules
were simply another species of law itself. They might coincide with
religious or moral precepts, just as substantive laws might coincide with
such precepts, but ethical rules were still, ultimately, of human manufac-
ture and the result of the same struggles for power that produced the laws
of procedure, tort, contract, or civil rights.
One of the beneficial consequences of positivist and realist thought
was emancipation. Lawyers were now philosophically free to treat all law
as subject to revision. Everything was now conceivably in play. Lawyers
could constantly "push the envelope," seeking to modify legal rules, with
no qualms that in attempting to change legal precepts they were defying the
will of God or upsetting the natural order of the Universe.
The modem lawyer, of course, may well have strong philosophical
or religious beliefs, an abiding moral sense of right and wrong that derives
from those religious or philosophical beliefs, and a reluctance to advance
a legal cause or attempt to modify the law in such a way that would conflict
with those beliefs. But many legal issues will not be tied in any clear
way to the lawyer's religious or philosophical views. A lawyer might
well feel philosophically comfortable with either side of a legal
dispute. In such a case, the lawyer will tend to see the legal dispute as
a "game" of sorts, a game of power allocation, a game that may be
enormously serious and important, but a game without deep moral
implications, at least without any moral implications that are from this
lawyer's perspective readily discemable.
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Because ethical rules are also a species of law, some lawyers are also
likely to see many ethical rules as subject to change and evolution every
bit as freely as rules of substantive law. Just as modem American lawyers
may feel great freedom to push the envelope of tort or contract, they may
feel corresponding freedom to push the envelope of ethical cannons. While
some ethical cannons may coincide with lawyers' larger religious or moral
beliefs, many may not,just as many principles of substantive law may not,
and in such cases there is likely to be a sense of contingency, mutability,
and endless contest to ethical principles.
The Split Between the Lawyer as Warrior
and the Lawyer as Facilitator
A new, emerging split within the profession is the divergence
between the ideal of the lawyer as a combatant and the ideal of the lawyer
as a facilitator of resolution. This is a split that may ultimately prove to be
a positive for the profession.
In a fiercely adversarial system, lawyers may come to see their role
as that of warriors, trained to seek the unconditional surrender of the
adversary. Much of the current momentum toward the exploration of
different forms of alternative dispute resolution, however, is animated by
a different vision of the lawyer: the lawyer as a mediator, a problem-solver,
a facilitator of resolution. Now the goal is not to crush the enemy, but to
work with the other side, looking for a settlement that all can live with and
that allows the real business of life to move forward.
The skills of reaching resolution are not necessarily the same skills
as those that make fordominating an adversary. The ability to see the world
from the other side's perspective, to make realistic assessments of one's
own needs, to massage disputes in the search for common ground, to
maintain lines of communication and dialogue-all help in reaching
satisfactory settlements. These talents and affinities do not always co-exist
peacefully with such attributes as tenacity and gamesmanship, qualities
that are often seen as more likely to produce litigation.victory.
As lawyers are called upon increasingly by a restless society to play
the role of problem-solvers and dispute resolvers, the intensity of some of
the more corrosive splits talked about in this essay may abate somewhat.
Lawyers may find themselves engaging in a more holistic version of legal
practice, with the side benefit of living less split and more whole profes-
sional lives.
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Conclusion: Thoughts on the Split
Between Action and Contemplation
The final split is the dichotomy between action and contemplation.
Law on the street is law in action, law as applied science, law as hustle and
bustle and billing, law in which the lawyer is constantly pressed to act,
react, move and respond on instinct or instant judgment. Day-in-and-day-
out it is not a life for the faint-hearted, nor one that offers much time to
develop the inner poet or philosopher.
Ironically, however, the training of lawyers is, in its classical form,
largely an intellectual enterprise, an enterprise designed to broaden the life
of the mind. The modem law school heavily emphasizes philosophy and
public policy in its curriculum. Indeed, as a general matter, the more elite
the law school, the more likely it is that the mode of instruction will heavily
integrate discussion of legal doctrine or practical lawyering skills with
instruction in economics, sociology, science, history, philosophy, and
literature. Elite law schools are very much extensions of traditional liberal
arts education.
In law school, though not necessarily in legal practice, students
with a touch of the poet, with a flair for philosophical rigor, will often
out-perform students with more pragmatic talents. For many lawyers,
this split is easily dealt with. You struggle through law school and all
the theory they teach you there, then you take the bar exam, which is
largely rote memory and little philosophy, and then you hang your
diploma and your license on the wall and you hunker down to actual
legal practice, leaving all that theory behind in the memory bank
where we file rites of passage.
For a surprising number of lawyers, however, the split between
the philosophical issues discussed in law school and the press and
pressures of practice creates a nagging discontent. Many lawyers feel
undernourished by practice; they long for an occasional philosophical
interlude, for a respite for contemplation, for the soul-food of poetry
and theory. A lawyer lucky enough to occasionally practice in areas of
the law where "the great issues" are front and center in legal dispute
may not have this problem. But most lawyers do not have this luxury.
This accounts for the fact that when Continuing Legal Education
Programs offer the occasional program on legal philosophy, or moral
conflicts in the law, or law and literature, they quickly tend to become
over-subscribed. Lawyers with no time for contemplation or reflec-
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tion in their practice may gradually come to feel hollowed out and
burned up, needing retreat and contemplation to replenish their inner
stores.
